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Abstract
We consider a duopoly model in which rms with di¤erent costs supply two
vertically di¤erentiated products in the same market. We show that the e¢ cient
rm produces more of the high-quality good and the ine¢ cient one produces more
of the low-quality good in equilibrium. We also nd that a change in the quality
superiority of goods and relative cost e¢ ciency ratios leads to cannibalization from
one good to the other and characterize graphically the product line strategies of
rms through the two ratios.
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1 Introduction
A real economy has oligopolistic markets in which rms produce and sell multiple, ver-
tically di¤erentiated products in the same market. Such markets present more cases of
cannibalization. Cannibalization occurs in a market when a rm increases the output of
one of its products by reducing the output of a similar product competing in the same
market.
The objective of this study is to examine cannibalization in a market from the strategic
viewpoint of a multi-product rm supplying two goods di¤erentiated in quality.
We do not consider new entries to the market and the choice of quality level, as in
Johnson and Myatt (2003), but a duopoly in which each rm produces and supplies
two vertically di¤erentiated goods, that is, a high-quality and a low-quality good, in
the market. We then explore the condition under which both rms specialize in, or
else one of them specializes in, the high-quality or low-quality good. To understand
how cannibalization a¤ects the product line strategies of rms, we consider two ratio
indicators: (1) quality superiority ratio of the high-quality good relative to the low-
quality good, and (2) the relative marginal cost e¢ ciency ratio of the high-quality good
between the two rms.
We nd that cannibalization is a product line control strategy characterized by the
quality superiority of the high-quality good relative to the low-quality good and the
relative cost e¢ ciency of the e¢ cient rm. By limiting our study to at most two vertically
di¤erentiated goods that each rm supplies to the same market, we characterize the
product line strategies of rms through cannibalization graphically in the plane of the
two ratio indicators.
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2 The Model and Derivation of an Equilibrium
Suppose there are two rms, i = 1; 2, and each rm produces two goods (good H and
good L) di¤ering in terms of quality, where 1 and 2 imply rms 1 and 2, respectively, in
the duopoly. Let VH and VL denote the quality level of the two goods. We assume that the
maximum amount consumers are willing to pay for each good is VH = VL =  > VL = 1.
Thus, for simplicity, we normalize the quality of the low-quality good as VL = 1 and
assume that the quality of the high-quality good is  fold that of the low-quality good.
Good  (= H;L) is assumed to be homogeneous for any consumer.
Consumer preferences are standard a la MussaRosen. Following the standard spec-
ication in the literature, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985), we assume a continuum
of consumers characterized by taste parameter , which is uniformly distributed between
0 and r(> 0), with density 1. We further assume that a consumer of type  2 [0; r];for
r > 0, obtains a net surplus from one unit of good  from rm i at price pi. Thus, the
utility (net benet) of consumer  who buys good  (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2) can be
given by
Ui() = V   pi i =; 1; 2  = H;L: (1)
Each consumer decides to buy either nothing or one unit of good  from rm i to maximize
his/her surplus.
From the following three usual assumptions about consumers, we derive the demand
for good H as QH = r b and that for good L as QL = b iL, where Q = qi+qj;  =
H;L; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2: The demand function is similar to that derived in Bonanno (1986),
but it varies from Bonnano in that both rms supply two vertically di¤erentiated products
in the same market. For details of the derivation, see Kitamura and Shinkai (2013).
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Here, b, the threshold between the demand for products H and L, is given by
b = (pH   pL)=(  1): (2)
We then obtain the inverse demand functions as follows:8>><>>:
pH = (r  QH) QL
pL = r  QH  QL:
(3)
Furthermore, assume that each rm has constant returns to scale and that ciH > ciL =
cjL = cL = 0, where ci is rm is marginal and average cost of good . This implies that
a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of production than a low-quality good. Here,
without loss of generality, we assume that c2H > c1H = 1 > ciL = 0, implying that rm 1
is more e¢ cient than rm 2. Under these assumptions, each rms prot can be dened
as follows:
i = (piH   ciH)qiH + piLqiL i = 1; 2; (4)
where pi is the price of good  sold by rm i and qi is the rms output of good . Each
rm chooses a quantity of supply that maximizes its prot function in Cournot fashion.
By solving the system of usual rst-order condition equations of qiH and qiL, i = 1; 2,
we obtain the following Nash equilibrium quantities:
8>><>>:
q1H = (r   (2  c2H)=(  1))=3; q1L = (2  c2H)=(3(  1))
q2H = (r   (2c2H   1)=(  1))=3; q2L = (2c2H   1)=(3(  1)):
(5)
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We nd that the second-order condition holds for both rms. From (5), the nonnegative
output condition, and the assumption that c2H > 1, we nd that
q1L R 0, 2 R c2H
q2H > (=)0,  > ()(2c2H   1 + r)=r
q1H > (=)0,  > ()(2 + r   c2H)=r (6)
hold.
From (3) and (5), we obtain the following equilibrium prices of the goods:
pH = (r + c2H + 1)=3; p

L = r=3. (7)
We also obtain the equilibrium prot of rm i:
1 = fr2   2r(2  c2H) + (2  c2H)2=(  1)g=9; (8)
2 = fr2   2r(2c2H   1) + (2c2H   1)2=(  1)g=9: (9)
Thus, we can easily establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a versioning strategy equilibrium in which both rms
produce both types of goods. In the equilibrium, q1H > q

2H , q

2L > q

1L, and 

1 > 

2.
Proof: From the equilibrium outcomes of (5), (8), and (9), we have
q1H   q2H = q2L   q1L > 0, (10)
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and
1   2 > 0,  > (2r + 1 + c2H)=(2r).
However, for q2H > 0,  > (2c2H + r   1)=r must hold. Nevertheless, we can show
that (2c2H + r  1)=r > (2r+1+ c2H)=(2r) if 1 < c2H ; therefore, if  > (2c2H + r  1)=r,
then  > (2r + 1 + c2H)=(2r) and the result follows.
The proposition implies that the e¢ cient rm 1 (ine¢ cient rm 2) produces more of
the high-quality good H (low-quality good L) than the ine¢ cient rm 2 (e¢ cient rm 1).
It also asserts that the e¢ cient rm 1 earns more than the ine¢ cient rm 2 because of the
cost e¢ ciency of rm 1 over rm 2 for the high-quality good H under the non-negative
assumption of output (6) in equilibrium.
Next, we examine the conditions under which cannibalization occurs from one product
to another in equilibrium. Note that a product cannibalizes a similar productwhen a
rm increases its output of the product by reducing that of a similar product supplied in
the same market.
From (5), we have
q2H   q2L R 0,  R (2(2c2H   1) + r)=r; (11)
q1H   q1L R 0,  R (2(2  c2H) + r)=r; (12)
and
q2H   q1L = q1H   q2L R 0()  R (c2H + 1 + r)=r. (13)
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From (6), we also nd that
(c2H+1+r)=r > (2c2H 1+r)=r and (2(2 c2H)+r)=r R (2c2H 1+r)=r () 5=4 R c2H :
(14)
Thus, from (5), we immediately obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the duopoly equilibrium derived as above, the following inequalities
hold for the outputs of the high-quality and low-quality goods of each rm:
0 < q2H < q

1L < q

1H  q2L for (2c2H   1 + r)=r <   (c2H + 1 + r)=r and 1 < c2H < 2 (I )
0 < q1L < q

2H < q

2L < q

1H for (2c2H   1 + r)=r <  < (2(2  c2H) + r)=r and 1 < c2H < 2 (II )
0 < q1L < q

2L  q2H < q1H for (2(2c2H   1) + r)=r <  and 1 < c2H < 2 (III ),
where the Greek numbers in the equations represent the area number in Figure 1.
Figure 1 summarizes the result of proposition 2 in the c2H    plane.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
Note that we assume c2H > c1H = 1 and VH = VL =  > VL = 1. Thus, the
horizontal and vertical axes variables in Figure 1 imply the relative cost ratio c2H and
quality value ratio . At any point (c2H ; ) in Areas I, II, and III in Figure 1, both rms
supply high- and low-quality goods. Thus, as the quality value ratio  is su¢ ciently
high and the relative cost ratio c2H su¢ ciently low in these areas, the ine¢ cient rm
produces far more of the low-quality good with no production cost than it does of the
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high-quality good, which has a higher positive cost. In contrast, the e¢ cient rm produces
moderately more of the high-quality good H than it does of the low-quality good L, since
its production cost for good H is lower than that of its rival rm. However, its marginal
revenue from goodH is not high, because its quality superiority  is not very large. As the
point (c2H ; ) moves from Area I to Areas II and III in Figure 1, cannibalization proceeds
from the low-quality good to the high-quality good in both rms. Such cannibalization
is stronger for the e¢ cient rm than for the ine¢ cient one.
This result is consistent with Calzada and Valletti (2012), where the optimal strategy
for a lm studio is to introduce versioning if their goods are not close substitutes for each
other. Thus, when the quality superiority of the high-quality good H is large compared
to good L to some extent, we can conclude that they are not close substitutes for each
other. Then, the result in the above proposition conrms that it would be better for both
rms to supply both goods in the market, that is, to obey the versioning strategy" in
Calzada and Valletti (2012).
In contrast, we examine the case in which the quality speriority  is not large and the
relative cost e¢ ciency c2H is strong. We examine the relationship between the equilibrium
outputs carefully in (14) and (5), to obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 From the duopoly equilibrium derived above, we nd that
q1L = 0 < q

2L < q

2H < q

1H  for 1 <  < (2  c2H + r)=r and 2 < c2H (VI )
q1L = 0 < q

2H < q

2L < q

1H for (2c2H   1 + r)=r <  < (2(2  c2H) + r)=r and 2 < c2H (V )
q2H = q

1L = 0 < q

1H < q

2L for 1 <  < (c2H + 1 + r)=r and 2 < c2H (IV )
q2H = 0 < q

1L < q

1H < q

2L for 1 < (2(2c2H   1) + r)=r <  < (2c2H   1 + r)=r;
5=4 < c2H < 2 (VII )
q2H = 0 < q

1H < q

1L < q

2L for 1 < (2 + r   c2H)=r <  < (c2H + 1 + r)=r;
 < (2(2c2H   1) + r)=r and 1 < c2H < 2 (VIII )
q2H = q

1H = 0 < q

1L < q

2L for 1 <  < (2 + r   c2H)=r and 1 < c2H < 2 (IX ),
where the Greek numbers in the equations represent the area numbers in Figure 1.
Figure 1 summarizes the results of proposition 3 in the c2H    plane.
From (5), when the quality superiority  is small and the relative cost e¢ ciency c2H
are large, the e¢ cient rm never supplies its low-quality good, and so in equilibrium, the
market at rst becomes a three-goods market. At any point (c2H ; ) in Areas V and VI,
the market is lled with large quantities of the high-quality good H supplied by both
rms, but has relatively small quantities of the low-quality good L supplied by rm 2. As
the quality superiority  reduces further, the ine¢ cient rm 2 stops producing the high-
quality good H and specializes in the low-quality good. Thus, in Area IV, the e¢ cient
rm 1 specializes in supplying the high-quality good and the ine¢ cient rm 2 specializes
in supplying the low-quality good and the market becomes a vertically di¤erentiated
two-goods market.
On the other hand, when the relative cost e¢ ciency c2H is su¢ ciently small, if the
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relative quality superiority  also reduces to nearly one and the goods become close
substitutes to each other, the best strategy for both rms is to stop production of its
high-quality good H and specialize in the low-quality good L. In Area IX, the market
becomes a two low-quality goods market!
3 Conclusion
In this study, we considered and proposed a duopoly cannibalization model in which two
rms produce and sell at most two distinct products that are di¤erentiated vertically in
the same market. We showed that in the market equilibrium, the e¢ cient rm produces
more of the high-quality good and the ine¢ cient one more of the low-quality good. When
the relative quality superiority of the high-quality good is small (large), cannibalization
is stronger in rm 2 (rm 1) than in rm 1 (rm 2).
Furthermore, we showed that a change in the ratios of quality superiority and relative
cost e¢ ciency leads to cannibalization and that it crucially a¤ects the decision making
of a rms product line.
4 Acknowledgement
The authors are grateful to Tommaso Valletti, Federico Etro, Noriaki Matsushima, Toshi-
hiro Matsumura, Kenji Fujiwara, and Keizo Mizuno for their useful comments on an
earlier version of this manuscript. The second author was supported by MEXT Grants-
in-Aid for Scientic Research (Nos. 23330099 and 24530255).
10
References
[1] Bonanno, G. (1986), Vertical Di¤erentiation with Cournot Competition,Economic
Notes, 15, No.2, pp.68-91.
[2] Calzada, J. and Valletti, T. (2012), Intertemporal Movie Distribution: Versioning
when Customers Can Buy Both Versions,Marketing Science, 31, No.4, pp.649-667.
[3] Johnson, J. P. and Myatt, D. (2003), Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting
Brands and Product Line Pruning,American Economic Review, 93, No.3, pp.3748-
3774.
[4] Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1985), Network Externalities, Competition, and Compat-
ibility,American Economic Review, 75, No.3, pp.424-440.
[5] Kitamura, R. and Shinkai, T. (2013), The Economics of Cannibalization: A Duopoly
in which Firms Supply Two Vertically Di¤erentiated Products, presented paper in
the EARIE 2013, Annual Conference of European Association for Research Industrial
Economics, Evora, Portugal August 30-September 1, pp.1-22 (August, 2013).
[6] Motta, M. (1993), Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 41, No.2, pp.113-131.
11
0 1 2 3 4 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 
 
Line A: rrc H /)12( 2  , Line B: rcr H /)2( 2 , Line C: rrc H /))12(2( 2   
Line D: rrc H /))2(2( 2  , Line E: rrc H /)1( 2   
 
Figure 1 Classification of Product Line Strategy in Hc2  Plane ( 3r ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Hc  4/52 Hc  22 Hc
1
  
Hc2
IV 
V 
VI 
VII VIII IX 
Line A 
Line B  
Line C
Line D 
Line E 
I II
III 
